

Analysis of “ACK-storm” Packet

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1 Summary

A vector spectrum analyzer transmitted a malformed TCP/IP packet over its ethernet interface. The packet was received by all devices on the APS control subnet. A fault in the vxWorks network code within the IOCs and other devices on the network caused each to transmit the malformed packet again. The resulting exponential increase in network traffic completely overloaded the system, disrupted normal network operation and brought the control system to a halt.

The short-term solution is to cease communication with the offending vector spectrum analyzer. The Information Systems Support group is investigating the possibility of programming the network switches to prevent such malformed packets from being forwarded from the vector spectrum analyzer to the control system network. Wind River Systems has been informed of the fault in vxWorks.

2 Example packet

A trace of the headers of a packet making up the storm of network traffic is shown below.

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1 - - - - - Frame 21 - - - - -
2 Frame Status Source Address Dest. Address Size Rel. Time Delta Time
3 21 [164.54.2.68] [164.54.2.152] 60 0:00:00.001 0.000.308
4 DLC: ----- DLC Header -----
5 DLC:
6 DLC: Frame 21 arrived at 17:55:31.5342; frame size is 60 (003C hex) bytes.
7 DLC: Destination = Multicast 01005E360298
8 DLC: Source = Station 0030D30530C1
9 DLC: Ethertype = 0800 (IP)
10 DLC:
11 IP: ----- IP Header -----
12 IP:
13 IP: Version = 4, header length = 20 bytes
14 IP: Type of service = 00
15 IP: 000. .... = routine
16 IP: ...0 .... = normal delay
17 IP: .... 0... = normal throughput
18 IP: .... .0.. = normal reliability
19 IP: .... ..0. = ECT bit - transport protocol will ignore the CE bit
20 IP: .... ...0 = CE bit - no congestion
21 IP: Total length = 40 bytes
22 IP: Identification = 48677
23 IP: Flags = 0X
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24      IP:          .0.. .... = may fragment
25      IP:          ..0. .... = last fragment
26      IP: Fragment offset = 0 bytes
27      IP: Time to live   = 37 seconds/hops
28      IP: Protocol      = 6 (TCP)
29      IP: Header checksum = 8A62 (correct)
30      IP: Source address   = [164.54.2.68]
31      IP: Destination address = [164.54.2.152]
32      IP: No options
33      IP:
34 TCP: ----- TCP header -----
35      TCP:
36      TCP: Source port           = 5025
37      TCP: Destination port      = 38359
38      TCP: Sequence number       = 3201271355
39      TCP: Next expected Seq number = 3201271355
40      TCP: Acknowledgment number = 562970529
41      TCP: Data offset           = 20 bytes
42      TCP: Flags                 = 10
43      TCP:          ..0. .... = (No urgent pointer)
44      TCP:          ...1 .... = Acknowledgment
45      TCP:          .... 0... = (No push)
46      TCP:          .... .0.. = (No reset)
47      TCP:          .... ..0. = (No SYN)
48      TCP:          .... ...0 = (No FIN)
49      TCP: Window                = 8176
50      TCP: Checksum               = F2E8 (correct)
51      TCP: No TCP options
52      TCP:
53

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3 Notes

1. Line 7 – The least-significant bit of first octet of the destination ethernet address is set indicating that the packet is an ethernet broadcast packet and will be received by all devices on the network.
2. Line 8 – This packet is being sent from an HP/Agilent E5810A GPIB/LAN adapter. **Many** similar packets were recorded from other devices too.
3. Line 27 – This packet has 37 more hops to continue the storm. Assuming that there are 200 devices with this bug on the network this corresponds to a theoretical generation of 200^{37} (greater than 10^{85}) more packets. Clearly this represents a ‘significant’ load on the network.
4. Line 30 – The IP source address is that of ‘hpvecsr’, an HP 89441A vector spectrum analyzer. Presumably this was the device which initiated the storm by sending the malformed packet.
5. Line 31 – The IP destination address is that of ‘omicron’, the IOC which was communicating with the vector spectrum analyzer.
6. Line 36 – The TCP source port is that used by the HP 89441A further strengthening the argument that it was the device which initiated the network storm.

4 Resolution

4.1 Short-term attempts

The IOC which was communicating with the vector spectrum analyzer has been stopped. This should prevent the vector spectrum analyzer from transmitting the malformed packets which precipitate the network storm. Clearly this is not an adequate long-term solution however.

A vxWorks kernel which will not perform packet forwarding has been built. This kernel will be loaded into as many IOCs as possible. This is not a true solution though since there are many IOCs with an associated MVME-162 card. These IOCs must perform packet forwarding. As well, there are devices such as the GPIB/LAN adapters over which we have no control. The result is that there will still be more than 50 devices on the network still willing to participate in a network storm.

4.2 Long-term solutions

The Information Systems Support group is investigating the possibility of adding a packet filter to the network switch which will prevent malformed packets from the HP 89441 from being forwarded to the control system network. This still leaves the possibility of some other device triggering a network storm however.

HP/Agilent has been informed of the problem in the HP 89441. A quick response seems doubtful since the device is quite old.

Wind River Systems have been informed of the problem in the vxWorks kernel. Once they provide a patch to fix the problem new kernels can be loaded into all IOCs. This will leave the GPIB/LAN adapters as the only devices willing to participate in a network storm. HP/Agilent will be informed of the problem and may be able to provide a patch to the firmware. Only when all devices on the control network have been fixed so that they no longer forward malformed packets will the network truly be safe.